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ABSTRACT
Previous research has shown that people wish a premium to be placed on the prevention
of certain types of deaths as they perceive those deaths as ‘worse’ than others. The
research reported in this paper is an attempt to quantify such a ‘bad death’ premium via a
discrete choice experiment (DCE). The four underlying attributes included were: the age
of the victim, who was most to blame for the death, the severity of the victim’s pain and
suffering in the period leading up to death, and the duration of the victim’s pain and
suffering in the period leading up to death. In addition, a fifth attribute - number of
deaths- was included in order to provide a quantitative scale against which to measure the
“bad death premium”. The results show that each of the 4 underlying attributes did matter
to respondents in determining whether deaths were worse than others, but also uncovered
marked insensitivity to variations in the number of those deaths. The implication of our
findings for the use of quantitative variables in DCEs is discussed.
Key words: discrete choice experiment, value of preventing a fatality, relative weights,
insensitivity.
JEL classification: H5, I10.2
1. Introduction
People regard some deaths as worse than others (Sunstein, 1997). For example, research
has shown that a premium is placed on reducing the risks of, and saving lives from,
certain types of deaths. This includes a higher premium for cancer deaths over deaths
from heart disease, motor vehicle accidents, household fires or airplane accidents (Jones-
Lee, Hammerton & Philips, 1985; Savage, 1993), deaths of cyclists over deaths of
construction workers (Mendeloff & Kaplan, 1989) and deaths of 20-year olds over the
deaths of 60-year olds (Cropper, Aydede & Portney, 1994). Likewise, studies have
shown a higher premium for airplane deaths over deaths from heart attacks (Sunstein,
1997), deaths caused by exposure to industrial air pollution over deaths caused by
smoking or automobile accidents (Subramanian & Cropper, 2000) and deaths in car
accidents and fires in public places over deaths in domestic fires and railway accidents
(Chilton, Covey, Hopkins et al., 2002). Other studies have shown a higher premium for
deaths from lung disease due to industrial air pollution over deaths from liver disease due
to contaminated drinking water (Hammitt & Liu, 2004) and deaths in airplane journeys
over deaths in taxi journeys (Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman & Martinsson, 2004).
These studies have suggested a number of explanations as to why people are more averse
to certain types of deaths than others. The evidence suggests that they are concerned
particularly about those deaths which affect them – or people close to them –personally
(Mendeloff & Kaplan, 1989; Subramanian & Cropper, 2000; Chilton et al., 2002), kill
young people (Cropper et al., 1994; Mendeloff & Kaplan, 1989), make people uneasy or
feel “dread” when thinking about them (Savage, 1993; Carlsson et al., 2004; Chilton et
al., 2002), and where the victims find it difficult to avoid the risk or are less to blame for
their death (Subramanian & Cropper, 2000; Chilton et al., 2002).
Whilst this research gives us a sense of what makes specific types deaths worse than
others, we are a long way from quantifying any “bad death premium” people may attach
to the underlying features or attributes of these deaths (cf. Sunstein, 1997). Quantification3
of this type would allow more generic conclusions to be drawn about the premium people
place, for example, on the deaths of children compared to the over 60s, or on deaths
where the victims are not to blame versus deaths where the victims are to blame.
To our knowledge, the research reported in this paper is the first to attempt such a
quantification. A discrete choice experimental design was implemented which enabled
us to estimate the “bad death premium” for four underlying features or attributes: the age
of the victim, who was most to blame for the death, the severity of the victim’s pain and
suffering in the period leading up to death, and the duration of the victim’s pain and
suffering in the period leading up to death. These last two attributes provided a specific
operationalisation of the “dread” factor based on Sunstein’s (1997) argument that
especially dreaded deaths from diseases like cancer and AIDS deserve special attention in
accordance with the degree of pain and suffering that precedes them. It should be noted
however that these attributes may not fully capture other types of uneasiness or “dread”
that might be associated with certain sudden, unanticipated, deaths like for example
airplane crashes or terrorist attacks.
In addition, it may be that the ‘badness’ of a particular death depends not only on its
generic characteristics (or attributes), but on the exact cause of death – or ‘context’. Any
marked differences in the perceived badness of a death when the context was known,
would suggest that we cannot estimate a bad death premium based on our knowledge of
the underlying attributes (i.e. ‘generic’ information) alone. Although not the focus of the
current paper, one aim of the study reported here was to explore the impact of contextual
information on the perceived badness of deaths.
2. Methodology
2.1. The DCE Study
Discrete choice modelling has its origins in marketing and consumer research where it
has been employed to establish the relative importance of different characteristics or4
attributes in the demand for different goods or services (Louviere, Hensher & Swait,
2000). It is also being used increasingly in environmental valuation and health economics
(Boxall, Adamowicz, Swait et al., 1996; Hanley, Wright & Adamowicz, 1998; Ryan &
Hughes, 1997; Ryan & Gerard, 2003).
In a typical discrete choice experiment (DCE) study, individuals are presented with -and
then asked to choose between -hypothetical goods or services involving different levels
of attributes identified as being important. The method is rooted in both random utility
theory (McFadden, 1973; Hanemann, 1984) and Lancaster’s economic theory of value
(Lancaster, 1966) which assumes that the choices people make are utility maximising and
can be decomposed into the constituent utility bearing characteristics or attributes of the
goods. As the assumptions inherent in the random utility model have been detailed
extensively elsewhere, no further details are given here ( see Louviere et al, 2000; Ryan
& Hughes, 1997; Ryan & Gerard, 2003).
2.2. Attributes and Levels
As noted in the introductory section, four attributes were identified as potentially
important factors in determining the “bad death premium”. To recap, these attributes
were: the age of the victim (age), who was most to blame for the death (blame), the
severity of the victim’s pain and suffering in the period leading up to death (severity), and
the duration of the victim’s pain and suffering in the period leading up to death
(duration). Having selected the attributes, the second stage in the design was to choose
the attribute levels. Levels were chosen that covered a plausible range of values for each
attribute and were distinct enough from each other to make trade-offs possible (see Table
1).
The age attribute was defined in terms of the age of the typical victim. The four levels
spanned the whole age range from the under 17s, 17-40s, 40-60s and over 60s. The blame
attribute was defined in terms of who was most to blame for the death. The four levels
were designed to cover situations where nobody in particular was to blame, to the
individuals themselves, other individuals, and business or government. The severity of5
pain and suffering attribute was defined in terms of the extent to which the victim’s
quality of life was affected in the period leading up to death. The two levels described the
victim’s quality of life as either a bit worse than normal or a lot worse than normal. The
duration of pain and suffering attribute was defined in terms of the length of time that the
victim’s quality of life was affected in the period leading up to death. The four levels
ranged from a few minutes, a couple of weeks, a year or two, and 3-5 years. One feature
of the model we set out below distinguishes it from those typically used in DCE studies: a
fifth attribute, numbers of deaths was included in the design to provide a quantitative
scale against which to measure the “bad death premium” associated with changes
between the levels of the other four attributes of interest (outlined in detail below)
1.
Hence, a number of deaths variable was added with four levels; 10, 15, 25, and 50. These
attributes and levels produce 512 different combinations.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
2.3. The experimental design
Having identified the attributes and their levels the decision of what combinations to
present as choices to respondents then arises. As a full factorial design would contain
descriptions of all 512 possible combinations, this was not considered to be a practical
option and some fractional factorial design was required. A fractional factorial design
was constructed that involved a sub-set of 64 scenarios paired to give 32 choices. The
design followed a ‘foldover’ methodology which allows for main effects to be estimated
and which controls for 2-way linear interactions (see Louviere et al, 2000). The 32 pairs
from the DCE design were then divided between three Versions of the questionnaire,
with two pairs being common across all three. An example of one of the choices used in
the design is given on the next page. An important feature of the 32 choices that made up
the DCE design was that levels on all 5 attributes varied simultaneously each time.
1 It should be noted, that other DCEs have used a ‘cost’ attribute as scale against which to measure the




Number of people who
die
15 deaths 25 deaths
Age-group Under 17 year olds 17-40 year olds
Quality of life in period
leading up to death
A bit worse than normal for last
1-2 years of their lives
A lot worse than normal for last
few weeks of their lives
Who is most to blame Business or government Nobody in particular









2.4. Overview of questionnaire design
The questionnaire was divided into two main sections; generic and contextual. In total,
the generic section consisted of 23 questions in the above format. The first five of these
were ‘practice’ questions. For each practice question the attributes of both scenarios
were the same except for one item. Each of the five practice questions then varied a
different attribute. As well as familiarising respondents with the choice task, three of
these questions provided a test of dominance. All else equal, we would expect that
increasing the severity and duration of suffering and the number of deaths would add to
the badness – or disutility -of the scenario
2.
Questions 6 to 23 were made up as follows. Twelve of them were part of the DCE design:
two (Q10 & Q18) were common to all three Versions and the other ten were unique to a
2 The two remaining attributes, blame and age do not yield obvious ‘dominance’ tests. Whilst we may
hypothesize about the direction of preferences in each case, there is no ‘logical’ response to these
questions.7
particular Version. Splitting the questions between versions in this way gave coverage of
all 32 pairs (i.e. 2 common questions and 30 version specific questions).
The other six questions in the generic section involved five pairs that would appear again
in the contextual section (as Q24 to Q28); but here the contextual information was
omitted and only the information about the underlying attributes given. One of these five
pairs was presented twice – first as Q6, then again as Q21 – in order to check stability of
responses. These six questions were not part of the DCE design and were included for
two reasons. Firstly, these questions provided a between-sample test of sensitivity to the
number of deaths; in moving from Versions 1 to 3 the number of deaths in scenario A
was increased from 10 to 15 and then to 25, whilst the number of deaths in B remained at
10 in all three Versions. As the number of deaths in A becomes progressively higher we
expect the proportion of respondents perceiving the deaths in B as worse than those in A
to be smaller in Version 2 than in Version 1 and smaller still in Version 3. Secondly,
these questions were used to see how well our estimated model could predict patterns of
response to other generic scenarios that were not part of the estimation procedure.








Age-group 17-40 year olds 17-40 year olds
Quality of life in
period leading up to
death
A bit worse than normal for
last few minutes of their
lives
A lot worse than normal for
last few minutes of their
lives
Who is most to
blame
The individuals themselves Business or government8
In the contextual section – Q24 to Q28- respondents were presented with 5 choices each
identical to one that appeared in the generic section, but with the context now revealed.
For example, Q24 was identical to the repeated question (Q6/Q21) in the generic section
except that the deaths were now described as being ‘of car drivers’ and ‘of rail
passengers’ in scenarios A and B respectively. Hence, a comparison of the generic and
contextual responses involves a within-subject comparison of responses. Table 2 shows
the full range of questions that appeared in the contextual section. These questions were
used to examine the extent to which inclusion of contextual information affected
responses. As the impact of context on responses is reported in detail elsewhere (ref
Anne’s paper), this aspect of the design is dealt with only briefly here.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
2.5. Data Collection
A total of 313 respondents were recruited by a professional market and social research
organisation (NWA) on a quota-sampling basis to be broadly representative of the socio-
demographic characteristics of the UK population. One hundred and fifty four
respondents (49.2%) were male and the average age was 44, (range 17 to 87). The data
were collected in focus groups of between 8 and 12 respondents moderated by the
authors. Groups were convened in Cambridge, Darlington, Durham, Norwich and
Stockton in the UK.
At the beginning of each group the moderator provided the participants with a handout
which explained the general purpose of the s t u d ya n dr e a l - w o r l de x a m p l e su s e dt o
illustrate the ways in which various types of deaths might differ on the attributes of
interest.
Respondents were then presented with the generic section and taken question-by-question
through the first five choices each of which varied the level of only one of the five
attributes. The aim of these questions was to test whether respondents understood the9
choice task and also provided the group with the opportunity to briefly discuss each
attribute in turn. When they had completed the first five questions respondents were
instructed to work through the remaining choices at their own pace. When all group
members had completed the generic section of the questionnaire there was an opportunity
for a brief discussion.
The generic section was then collected and the contextual section handed out.
Respondents’ attention was drawn to the fact that these questions now gave contextual
information and that there was an invitation not only to tick a box but also to write a
sentence or two in support of their decision. Finally, respondents were asked to complete
a questionnaire requesting basic demographic information along with details of existing
illness in the household
3. Results
Before presenting the results of the DCE model, we turn to the consistency checks that
were built into the study design.
3.1. Consistency Checks
The first type of consistency checks were tests of dominance. These tests were provided
by three of the first five choices that varied only one of the attributes. The percentages of
respondents passing the dominance tests were 83.4% for the duration attribute, 92.9% for
the severity attribute, and 92.3% for the deaths attribute. Hence, it did appear as if the
vast majority of respondents understood the questions and were ‘consistent’ in their
responses.
The second type of consistency check was test-retest reliability. This test was provided by
presenting identical scenarios in the 6
th and 21
st choices. The aggregate data showed that
75.9% of respondents thought B was slightly worse or much worse than A when the
scenario was presented as the 6
th choice increasing slightly but not significantly to 80.1%
when it was presented as the 21
st choice (
2(1)=1.605, p=.20). We used McNemar tests to10
look at this data in more detail. Briefly, this is a non-parametric sign test for matched
pairs of observations and tests whether there is any systematic pattern in those
respondents changing responses between the 6
th and 21
st choices.
Table 3 shows the patterns of choices in Version 1 of the questionnaire (in which the
numbers of deaths attribute had a level of 10 for both scenarios A and B). This shows that
the overall split between A and B is fairly stable – 15:86 in Q6, 14:87 in Q21 – but those
identifying B as worse become less extreme in their view: 61 regarded B as much worse
than A in Q6, but this number falls to 49 in Q21. The McNemar test shows no significant
difference at the 5% level - 
2(6)=5.13, p=.527. Although the data is not shown here, the
corresponding test statistics for Versions 2 and 3 are: 
2(6)=9.58, p=.143 and 
2(6)=6.82,
p=.337 respectively. Hence, there are no systematic differences between responses to the
two questions, indicating a good level of test-retest reliability. For the sake of parsimony,
responses to Q21 only are presented below.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The third type of consistency check is the between-sample test of the sensitivity to the
number of deaths. Table 4 shows the percentages making each response in the three
Versions. Recall that in moving from Versions 1 to 3 the level of the number of deaths in
scenario A increased from 10 to 15 and then to 25, while the number of deaths in B
remained at 10 in all three Versions. As the number of deaths in A becomes progressively
higher we expect the proportion of respondents perceiving the deaths in B to be worse
than those in A to be smaller in Version 2 than in Version 1 and smaller still in Version 3.
Table 4 shows that, as the number of deaths in scenario A was increased from 10 to 15
and then to 25 the percentages of respondents rating B as slightly worse OR much worse
than A reduced from 86.1%
3 in version one to 83.3% in version two to 70.4% in version
three. A Pearson’s chi squared test for independent samples shows that responses are
significantly different across the three versions 
2(6)=18.57, p =.005..
3 This figure is derived by summing the last 2 columns of table 3 i.e. 37.6% + 48.5%= 86.1% Ditto for
versions 2 & 3.11
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
The final type of consistency check built into the overall study design was a test of the
impact of context on responses, results that are dealt with in more detail elsewhere (ref
Anne’s paper). Briefly, the results were mixed. For example, in the case of accidents at
work vs car drivers we found no significant differences between generic and contextual
responses when this pairing appeared as Q26 in Version 2 (10 vs 15 W=-1.47, p=0.14)
and Version 3 (25 vs 50 W=-0.37, p=0.72). Significant differences were, however, found
in a number of the other pairs considered. In the case of car drivers vs pedestrians
scenarios we found significant differences between the generic and contextual responses
both when that pairing appeared as Q26 in Version 1 (25 vs 15 W=-4.61, p=0.000) and as
Q28 in Version 3 (15 vs 25 W=-4.065, p=0.000). Further details of this aspect of the
study are available from the authors.
3.2. The DCE model
It is important to note that none of the results presented thus far involved those 32
pairings on which the DCE estimation procedure was based. We turn to those results
now.
A logit model was used which estimates the probability that one scenario in a pair is
considered to be worse than the other based on the levels of attributes in each. As logit is
a binary choice model, we combined response modes ‘slightly worse than’ and ‘much
worse than’ in the estimation process. On this basis, there was no significant difference in
response to those questions – Q10 (
2(2)=5.82, p =.054) and Q18 (
2(2)=2.417, p =.299)
– that were common to all three questionnaires. Hence, we considered it appropriate to
pool the data across the three versions of the questionnaire.
If we assume that the disutility of the particular type of death, U(X), is a function of the
age of the victim, the severity and duration of any period of ill-health prior to death, and
the primary responsibility/ blame for the death (i.e., U(X) = f(ageX, severityX, durationX,12
blameX), then the disutility of each combination of attributes and levels would be the
disutility of the particular type of death multiplied by the numbers of deaths specified.
Standard DCE estimation procedures, however, rely on taking absolute differences of






























B are the number of deaths in scenarios A and B respectively raised to
power  , and i is the coefficient on the i
th attribute. When  is set equal to one, all
deaths are given equal weight (i.e., 50 deaths would be given five times the weight of 10
deaths). Values of  less than 1 indicate a declining marginal disutility of deaths (i.e., 50
deaths would be given less than five times the weight of 10 deaths); while values of 
greater than 1 indicate an increasing marginal disutility of deaths. The remaining
attributes enter the model as dummy variables with the omitted dummies representing the
following base case: age (over 60s), severity (bit worse than normal), duration (last few
minutes), blame (nobody in particular).
The disutility of this ‘base case’ of death was accorded a value of 1. We first estimated
the model with  = 1, but a number of the coefficients appeared to have the wrong sign
and did not appear to fit the data at all well. It seemed that setting  = 1 imposed a
restriction on the weight placed on the number of deaths which diverged from what
respondents actually did to such an extent that it distorted many of the other parameter
estimates.
We then explored other values of  . A grid-search showed that the log-likelihood
function was minimized (i.e. the multiplicative model fitted best) when  =0 . 2 .T h e
results of estimating the model with  = 0.2 are shown in Table 5. Observations were not13
independent (as each respondent contributed 12 observations), so standard errors were
adjusted to allow for clustering by respondent.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
In our estimation the deaths variable is ‘offset’ to make the disutility of the base case type
of death equal to 1 and so no figure is given for this variable in table 5. The remaining
variables in table 5 are prefixed by a ‘D*’ to indicate that they are multiplicative in the
number of deaths. With  = 0.2 the coefficients shown in Table 5 are all signed in
accordance with prior expectations. The dummies on age show that disutility increases as
the age of the typical victim falls- i.e. deaths of younger people are worse, all other things
being equal. Also in line with expectations, the dummy for severity ‘lot worse than
normal’ (compared with ‘bit worse than normal’) increases the disutility of a scenario and
disutility increases with duration of suffering. The dummies relating to blame show an
interesting pattern. According to the model the dummy for blame ‘individuals
themselves’ shows reduced disutility relative to the base case ‘nobody in particular’. On
the other hand, the dummies for ‘other individuals’ and ‘business/ government’ both
increased the disutility of a scenario.
We turn now to how well each model predicts responses to those generic questions that
were not used in the estimation process. Again focusing on responses to Q21 (the generic
equivalent of the car driver/rail passenger comparison), Table 4 showed that, as the
number of deaths in scenario A was increased from 10 to 15 and then to 25 the
percentages of respondents rating B as slightly worse OR much worse than A reduced
from 86.1%
4 in version one to 83.3% in version two to 70.4% in version three. The
equivalent percentages predicted by the model are 85.6%, 83.3% and 79.5% in versions
one, two and three respectively, not markedly different from the actual data. However,
the model does appear to underestimate the sensitivity to the number of deaths. Consider
4 This figure is derived by summing the last 2 columns of table 3 i.e. 37.6% + 48.5%= 86.1% Ditto for
versions 2 & 3.14
that, in moving from Version 1 to Version 3, the model predicts the numbers rating B as
worse than A to fall by 6.1% whereas the actual data showed a fall of 15.7%
5.
This underestimation led us to fit a model with  = 0.3 which was found to be a better fit
of the data from the 21
st choice (coefficients shown in Table 6). The predicted
percentages of respondents rating B as slightly worse or much worse than A were 82.4%
in Version 1, 78.0% in Version 2 and 70.5 % in Version 3 (i.e., a difference between
versions one and 3 of 11.9%). In general, the model with  = 0.3 performed rather better
than that with  = 0.2 at predicting responses to the remaining pairings not reported here.
Even greater sensitivity of the fitted values would have been desirable in a number of
cases; but, raising  much further tended to destabilize other parameter estimates
6. Whilst
the model with  = 0.3 appears to be the best fit of our ‘out of sample’ data, we focus
below on the model with  = 0.2 which was the best fit of the data used in the estimation
procedure.
4. Discussion
The model presented above sets out to provide a ‘generic’ tool that may be used to
estimate the relative badness of types of deaths that may be described in terms of levels
on the four attributes. For example, we may use the coefficients on the model to estimate
the disutility- or badness- of one death of a particular type by simply adding up the scores
on the coefficients, allowing the disutility of the ‘base type’ of death
7 to take on a value
of 1.
For example, suppose we wished to compute the relative badness of two deaths which
differed only in terms of who was most to blame for the deaths, holding other attributes
5 This is derived by subtracting 70.4% from 86.1%=15.7%.
6 Setting  = 0.4 resulted in a number of coefficients taking on the ‘wrong’ sign and a dramatic fall in the
value of the log-likelihood.
7 Recap, the ‘base type’ of death is: age (over 60s), severity (bit worse than normal), duration (last few
minutes), blame (nobody in particular.)15
constant. Consider two types of deaths- A and B- both affecting people over 60 whose
quality of life would have been a lot worse than normal for the last 1-2 years of their
lives, only differing in terms of who is most to blame for the deaths –business or
government in the case of death A and the individuals themselves in the case of death B.
By adding up the scores on the relevant coefficients from the  = 0.2 model we would
get:
Udeath A= 1 + 0 + 0.331 + 0.276 + 0.537 = 2.144
Udeath B = 1 + 0 + 0.331 + 0.276 + -0.259 = 1.348
where 1 is the disutility of the ‘single death’ base case, 0.331 is the coefficient on
severity (lot worse than normal), 0.276 is the coefficient on duration (1-2 years), and
0.537 and -0.259 are the coefficients on blame (business/ government and individuals
themselves respectively): the zeros included in the expressions reflect the fact that ‘age’
was the same as for the base case. The relative badness or disutility ratio between the two









The corresponding estimate from the model in which  = 0.3 is 1.73.
Consider another two deaths- C and D -both involving quality of life a bit worse than
normal for the last few minutes of their lives, but which differ terms of the age of victims
(the over 60s in C and 17-40s in D) and blame (other individuals in C and individual
themselves in D). By the same method as above
8, this example would then yield a ratio of
1.107 using the  = 0.2 model.
Udeath C = 1 + 0.331 + 0.526 = 1.857
Udeath D = 1 + 0.605 + 0.331 + -0.259 = 1.677
8 In each case the ‘duration’ variables attract scores of zero as they are the same as the









The corresponding estimate from the model in which  = 0.3 comes out at 1.85.
On the face of it, such a model would allow decision makers to simply ‘plug in’ the
relevant characteristics of any two types of death in order to estimate the relative badness
of each. Further, the impact of varying a level on any one attribute may be assessed
directly (e.g. changing the ‘blame’ attribute from ‘individuals themselves’ to ‘other
individuals’) within such a tool. Such a tool would be useful to policy makers attempting
to quantify a bad death premium. There are, of course, a number of caveats to using the
model in this way, which we set out below.
Firstly, it may be the case that deaths cannot simply be described in generic terms and
that respondents may wish to consider additional ‘contextual’ information. That is, in
some cases, the specific cause of death may matter over and above knowledge of its
generic characteristics. Recall that significant differences between generic and contextual
responses in a number of the pairs considered here. This could well reflect the fact that
some influential variable(s) were omitted from the DCE model, or that being given
information about context caused certain categories of included variables to be
interpreted somewhat differently. Such issues require further examination before any
generic model may be used to estimate the badness of particular causes of death. Rather,
generic models ought to be interpreted as giving a broad indication of the types of factors
that matter to respondents and the likely importance of those factors, all else equal.
Secondly, the estimated model showed marked insensitivity to the number of deaths and
there are substantial – and, arguably, rather uncomfortable – implications of estimating 
at 0.2. In particular, rather than 50 deaths being five times as bad as 10 deaths,
estimating  = 0.2 implies that respondents regard 50 deaths as being just 1.37 times as
bad as 10 deaths. Whilst a degree of diminishing marginal utility (or disutility in this
case) might be expected under standard economic theory, it just seems implausible that17
50 deaths are only 1.37 times as bad as 10 deaths. Even when  is set = 0.3 (the model
which performed better at predicting responses to those generic questions not used in the
estimation procedure), 50 deaths are still only 1.62 times as bad as 10 deaths.
So, what is the possible explanation of this insensitivity which arises both in the
estimated model and, to a lesser extent, in the responses to those generic questions not
used in the estimation procedure? One possible explanation for the apparent insensitivity
to numbers, is that respondents simply classify levels on attributes as, for example,
‘high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’, ‘very low’ and disregard the numerical information. That is, 50
might be regarded as ‘high’, and 15 as ‘low’, but the weight given to the difference
between ‘high’ and ‘low’ would not necessarily reflect the magnitude of the differences
in either relative or absolute terms. This raises the possibility that, had different levels on
that attribute been selected- say, 20, 40, 60 & 100- then 100 may have been regarded as
‘high’ and 40 as ‘low’ and the information processed exactly as before.
Similarly, in discussing problems associated with the inclusion of probabilistic
information in DCEs, Lloyd (2003) argues that ‘fuzzy trace theory’ predicts that
respondents will result in risks being coded as ‘high’ or ‘low’. This theory, put forward
by Reyna and colleagues (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991) predicts that people only extract the
‘gist’ of any numerical information and then code this as a qualitative representation of
probability with no representation of the magnitude of the differences between risk
levels. As it is well documented that respondents use simplifying heuristics when
presented with complex decision tasks (see, for example, Payne & Bettman,), it seems
plausible that qualitative coding may also take place when respondents are presented with
other numerical attributes- such as the number of deaths variable used here.
As reliance on simplifying heuristics is known to increase as the task becomes more
complex, then any tendency to ‘code’ numerical information in this way is likely to be
greater when all attributes are varied simultaneously than when certain attributes are held
constant across choices. As outlined in the methods section, the 32 choices that made up
the DCE design varied all 5 attributes simultaneously, whilst the remaining generic18
questions (the counterparts of the contextual questions) generally held at least one of the
attributes constant across choices. This may offer some explanation of why the model –
based on the 32 questions in the DCE design- appears to predict less sensitivity than the
actual responses to the generic questions used in the ‘out of sample’ test of predictive
ability.
If at least a proportion of respondents in DCE studies are found to be processing
numerical information in this way, then this may have profound implications for the
reliability of the estimated values. In particular, the estimated values will be dependent
on the levels of the attributes selected for use in the design, a phenomenon that does not
appear to have been explored extensively in the literature. A number of studies that
include a ‘cost’ attribute in order to estimate WTP have uncovered some evidence that
estimates are dependent on the levels of that attribute. In one study that set out to
estimate women’s WTP for cervical screening programmes, estimates were found to be
sensitive to variations in the ‘price’ attribute across sub-samples (Ryan & Wordsworth,
2000). One large scale study conducted in Denmark set out to elicit preferences over
different health care systems and found the use of a wider cost range and inclusion of
higher payments to be associated with increased WTP values across sub-samples
(Skjoldborg & Gyrd-Hansen, 2003). Concerns about the choice of level on the cost
attribute in WTP studies in health have also been expressed by Ratcliffe (2000).
Further research is needed in order to determine whether this problem is pervasive in
DCE studies that use numerical information of some form of another (for example, risk
levels, WTP amounts or number of deaths) and it would appear to be relatively
straightforward to test. This will certainly involve between sample tests using different
levels- and possibly ranges- of the numerical variable and testing whether utility
estimates are robust across treatments. In-depth qualitative analysis may help to identify
whether or not a proportion of respondents are using some sort of coding heuristic and
whether this tendency is greater, the more complex the decision. If this is found to be the
case, then this would clearly have implications for the use of study designs such as the
one used here in which all attributes varied simultaneously.19
5. General Conclusions
As we have discussed there are a number of caveats associated with using the model we
have estimated in the way we propose. There are clearly a number of theoretical and
methodological issues that need to be addressed before such a model can be confidently
applied. So in that sense we are still some way from a robust and reliable quantification
how much of a “bad death premium” people attach to different types of underlying
features or attributes. This paper is however the first to attempt such an exercise and
despite its limitations provides the academic community with a good starting point to
take things further. Moreover, we highlight some issues surrounding the use of numerical
attributes in DCE studies and recommend areas where further research is needed.
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Table 1: Attributes and levels included in the DCE
Attributes Levels




Who is most to blame • Nobody in particular
• The individuals themselves
• Other individuals
• Business/ government
Severity of pain and suffering in period
l e a d i n gu pt od e a t h
• quality of life a bit worse than normal
• quality of life a lot worse than normal
Duration of pain and suffering in period
l e a d i n gu pt od e a t h
• a few minutes
• a couple of weeks
• a year or two
• 3-5 years




Table 2: The contextual scenarios
Question Version 1 Version 2 Version 3


















Q26 25 car drivers
vs
15 pedestrians
10 accidents at work
vs
15 car drivers

















































2 2 13 21 38
B much
worse than A
11 93 8 4 9
Total 6 9 25 61 10125











5.0% 8.9% 37.6% 48.5%
Version 2
(deathsA=15, deathsB=10)
3.7% 13.0% 53.7% 29.6%
Version 3
(deathsA=25, deathsB=10)
11.2% 18.4% 40.8% 29.6%26






D*age(<17s) .817 .065 <.001
D*age(17-40s) .605 .055 <.001




D*duration(couple of weeks) .152 .045 .001
D*duration(1-2yrs) .276 .047 <.001
D*duration(3-5yrs) .354 .053 <.001
D*blame(individuals themselves) -.259 .057 <.001
D*blame(other individuals) .526 .054 <.001











D*age(<17s) .526 .051 <.001
D*age(17-40s) .293 .041 <.001




D*duration(couple of weeks) .096 .034 .004
D*duration(1-2yrs) .175 .040 <.001
D*duration(3-5yrs) .316 .051 <.001
D*blame(individuals themselves) -.231 .047 <.001
D*blame(other individuals) .295 .043 <.001
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